Eveneens vinden we geen bewijs voor een robuust verband tussen concentratie en winstgevendheid.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, banks in Europe have greatly intensified their merger and acquisition activities (Berger et al., 1999) . By increasing the scale of operations, banks could supposedly generate efficiency gains and as a consequence improve profitability. However, numerous studies have shown that a merger between banks hardly improves cost efficiency (Canoy et al., 2001 ) . Vander Vennet (1999) goes even further and concludes that more market power and better prospects for growth and not efficiency gains were the primary motives for mergers and acquisitions in the European banking sector.
Academics and policy makers have expressed their concern about the increase in market shares of the larger E.U. banks, since higher levels of concentration may have a negative impact on competitive conditions, which, in turn, may lead to excessive bank profits. Indeed, Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) conclude that the increase in the degree of concentration in the European banking sector is negatively related to competition 1 . This paper studies the effects of the increase of concentration in the European banking sector on competition and profitability. In contrast to most other papers in this field, we focus on country level data, using panel regressions in which estimates from various recent studies on competition and efficiency in national banking sectors are related to concentration and profitability indicators for these sectors. We find no evidence that competition indicators are linked to profitability. Concentration and competition are also not related. Moreover, we do not find a robust relationship between concentration and profitability. We also report some mixed evidence for a positive connection between efficiency indicators and profitability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the trends in the European banking sector, while section 3 discusses recent empirical literature on competition, efficiency and concentration in the European banking sector. Section 4 describes the methodology and data used in our research. The fifth section sets out the results and section 6 contains a discussion of our explorative analysis. This section also has our conclusions. Table 1 provides data on the numbers and value of acquisitions for various European countries and compares them to those in the United States.
TRENDS IN THE EUROPEAN BANKING SECTOR

Mergers and acquisitions: numbers and value
Both the number and value of mergers and acquisitions in the United States are higher than in Europe.
In the 1997-1998 period, for example, five times as many mergers and acquisitions occurred in the US as in the Euro area. The general trend seems to be that the number of acquisitions in Europe is declining, while the total value is on the increase. We can thus conclude that the average value per acquisition has risen. That is not surprising since it is likely that, initially, small banks were the main targets for acquisition. The wave of consolidation in the Euro area seems to have had a strong impetus in 1997/98, given the sharp rise in the value of the transactions. 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997-98 b 1991-92 1993-94 1995-96 1997- 
National character of mergers and acquisitions
At present, the banks' acquisition activities seem to have a national focus. This is evident from Table   2 , which shows the annual number of mergers and acquisitions. The number of mergers exclusively involving domestic parties is given in parentheses. Spain is one of the few countries where @@@@@@ international mergers and acquisitions figure strongly. In 1999, for example, only 5 of the 17 mergers involved two Spanish parties. Dutch banks also appear to have a relatively strong international orientation. Table 3 shows the number of banks for 11 European countries and the United States. In both the 1980s and the 1990s, a decline in the number of banks can be observed. This applies to virtually all the countries in the table, Portugal being the only exception.
Number of banks
Degree of concentration
The degree of concentration can be measured in various ways (see Haaf, 2000 for an overview). The literature generally uses the ratio between the assets of the five largest banks' and total bank assets (C5 ratio) 3 . Instead of all assets, also specific assets (like deposits or loans) can be used for calculating the C5 ratio. The advantage of this ratio is that it is relatively easy to calculate. The disadvantage is that not all information about the market is used. From this point of view, the Herfindahl Index (HI) is a more useful indicator. The HI is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all banks in the sector (Haaf, 2000) . Table 4 shows the values of both measures for the 15 EU countries for selected years. In our empirical analysis we use both indicators. In this section, we discuss recent studies on concentration, competition, efficiency and profitability within the European banking sector. In a nutshell, we discuss the following: the use of the PanzarRosse methodology to measure competition, studies of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficiency-hypothesis, and finally, research on banking efficiency.
Empirical applications of the Panzar-Rosse methodology
The method of Panzar and Rosse (1977) constructs a measure of competition. This measure is called the H-statistic. The H-statistic is defined as the sum of the factor price elasticities of interest revenue with respect to borrowed capital, labour and physical capital.
The value of H can be interpreted as follows. In case of a monopoly, H is lower than or equal to zero.
This also applies to an oligopolistic market with cartels or complete imitation of each other's behaviour. A value of H between zero and one indicates monopolistic competition. A value equivalent to one points to perfect competition (De Bandt and Davis, 2000) .
Appendix A lists three recent studies that use this method 4 . De Bandt and Davis (2000) study the market structure in Germany, France and Italy at the start of EMU. For the first two countries, they find that monopolistic competition characterises the market for large banks and monopoly the market for small banks. In Italy, the market form in both sectors is monopolistic competition. On the basis of these results, they conclude that at the start of EMU, perfect competition was virtually non-existent.
According to Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) , monopolistic competition is the dominant market form in the European banking sector. Interestingly, these authors find a negative connection between a concentration index and their estimated H statistic. Both studies therefore conclude that further consolidation could reduce competition in Europe.
SCP paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm postulates a connection between market structure, behaviour and profitability. According to Goldberg and Rai (1996) , this paradigm provides an explanation for the positive connection between concentration and profitability often found in the American banking sector. The reasoning is as follows: in markets with a high degree of concentration, firms have more market power which allows them to set prices above marginal costs and achieve higher profits 5 .
Another explanation for the connection between concentration and profitability is the efficiency hypothesis. The efficiency hypothesis states that more efficient enterprises will be capable of expanding their market share and will have higher profitability. The posited connections are clarified in Figure 1 . connection between concentration and profitability, while market share appears to be of no influence.
On the basis of these findings, the authors reject the efficiency hypothesis in favour of the SCP hypothesis. Goldberg and Rai (1996) make some justified criticisms of this method. It is confusing to use the market share variable as an efficiency indicator, given that this variable may also refer to market power. It is better to directly include efficiency variables into the model. Goldberg and Rai (1996) do this for a set of large banks from various European countries. They find no connection between profitability and concentration but do find support for the efficiency hypothesis.
Bikker and Haaf (2002) also explore the SCP-hypothesis, investigating the relationship between market structure and conduct. To this end, they relate the H statistic, estimated following the PanzarRosse method, to the degree of concentration in the market. These authors find a negative connection between the two variables, leading them to conclude that increasing concentration in Europe would harm competition. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) reach the same conclusion on the basis of a similar analysis.
Efficiency of European banks
Recently, a number of studies have been published in which the banking sectors in the various European countries are compared to each other in terms of efficiency. While various efficiency studies had been carried out before, they generally related to a single country. Bikker (2001) , Wagenvoort and Schure (1999) and Altunbas et al. (2001) all estimate cost functions in order to measure so-called Xinefficiencies 6 . Bikker (2001) analyses 3085 banks in 9 European countries in the period 1989-97.
The study by Wagenvoort and Schure (1999) relates to 1974 European banks in the EU countries for the period 1993-1997, while the study by Altunbas et al. (2001) analyses 15 European banking markets between 1989 and 1997. All three studies conclude that there are major differences in efficiency, but their findings differ widely as to which country has the most efficient banking sector.
6 Lozano-Vivas et al. (2001) estimate the technical efficiency of banks in 10 European countries in 1993 using a Data Envelopment Analysis. As their estimates only relate to one year, they are not used in the present study. Bikker (2001) concludes that banks in Luxembourg, Belgium and Switzerland exceeded the average European level of efficiency. According to Wagenvoort and Schure, (1999) the banks in Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and the United Kingdom are the most efficient. In contrast, Altunbas et al. (2001) reach the conclusion that the most efficient banking sectors are those in Denmark, Germany, Italy and Austria. These major differences between studies on the efficiency of the banking sectors suggest caution when examining the connection between efficiency and concentration.
4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Methodology: panel regressions using country level data
We will investigate relationships between concentration, competition, profitability and efficiency at the macro-level by using panel regressions in which estimates from various recent studies on competition and efficiency in national banking sectors are related to concentration and profitability indicators for these sectors. Our methodology resembles that of Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) . These H1: A higher degree of concentration leads to less competitive behaviour.
H2:
A higher degree of concentration leads to greater profitability.
H3:
Less competitive behaviour will lead to greater profitability.
The efficiency hypothesis implies the following 2 hypotheses:
H4: Greater efficiency in the banking sector leads to higher profitability.
H5:
Greater efficiency will eventually result in a higher concentration in the banking sector.
We investigate the connection between indicators of concentration, profitability, competition and efficiency. To make as much use as possible of the available data, we estimate panel regressions. We only test for a connection between these variables which is not quite the same as a causal explanation.
However, the absence of a connection would be in conflict with the 2 hypotheses. We test every relationship shown in Figure 2 . For example, H1 is tested by running panel OLS regressions with a proxy for competition as the dependent variable and a proxy for the degree of concentration as an explanatory variable. We try to make our sample as large as possible. In all regressions we have the 15 EU countries. The number of years we can use ranges between 2 (when we use the H statistic) and 9
(when we study efficiency and profitability). In all cases, we estimate fixed effects panels.
In addition to the variables shown in figure 2, we use a set of control variables. When profitability is the dependent variable, we use the interest rate (i.e. the money market rate), inflation (the change in the consumer price index), GDP growth and (the natural logarithm of) the number of banks 7 . When competition is the dependent variable, we use the (natural logarithm of) the number of banks as a control variable, as suggested by Bikker and Haaf (2002) . We use a number of data sources. The European Central Bank (2000) provides various data on the degree of concentration in the European banking sector. We use C5 ratios and Herfindahl indices calculated on the basis of total assets, deposits and loans of the banking sector. These indicators are available for 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995-99 . The H statistics were taken from the studies by Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) and Bikker and Haaf (2002) and are available for 1989 , 1991 , 1996 and 1997 . 7 Huizinga and Demirgüç-Kunt (1998 use similar variables in their analysis of bank profitability in 80 countries. They find that a higher ratio between banks and GDP and a lower level of concentration reduce profitability. We find that bank assets relative to GDP are not related to profitability. Therefore, we report our results excluding this variable. Results including bank assets are available upon request from corresponding author.
Profitability figures are based on publications by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (1987, 1995 and 1999 further details on the data.
RESULTS
Does concentration coincide with less competition? (H1)
A higher degree of concentration means that the same number of producers has control over a larger share of the means of production. This could lead to anti-competitive behaviour. To investigate this connection, we estimate fixed effect panels for 1989, 1996 and 1997 with the H statistic as independent variable 8 . Table 5 shows our results. We have used various proxies for concentration: the C5 ratios (column 1 of Table 5 ) and the Herfindahl Index (column 2 of Table 5 ). These concentration indicators can be calculated on the basis of assets (column a), deposits (column b) or loans (column c). In most cases we do not find a significant relation between concentration and competition. This result differs from the findings by Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) . Column 3 of Table 5 shows that if we solely use the Bikker and Groeneveld figures for competition (which are available for 1989 and 1996)
we find a significant negative connection between competition and concentration. However, this only applies to the C5 indicator for assets (column 3a) and deposits (column 3b). If we use the Herfindahl index, there is again no significant connection between competition and concentration (column 4). Our conclusion is that the connection found by Bikker and Groeneveld is not robust:more observations and/or another indicator for concentration lead to a completely different result. So, all in all, we find little support for hypothesis H1. Table 6 gives an overview of the results obtained by regressing profit on concentration. We use two indicators for profit: return on equity (columns 1 and 2) and return on assets (columns 3 and 4).
Is concentration positively related to profitability? (H2)
Concentration is again proxied by the C5 ratio (columns 1 and 3) and the Herfindahl Index (columns 2 and 4) using assets (column a), deposits (column b) or loans (column c).
Our results provide no support for the second hypothesis. In 7 out of 12 cases the coefficient is significant at the 5% level, but the coefficients in these cases are negative. We also find evidence that there is a negative relationship between interest rates and profitability. This effect is the strongest if we relate C5 ratios and the return on equity. There is also evidence for a positive relationship between GDP growth and profitability. This effect also is the strongest for the C5 ratios.
As it can be argued that observations from the 1980s and those from the 1990s are too different to be included in one sample, we have re-estimated the relationship between concentration and profitability using only observations for the period 1995-1997. It turns out that in this period there is no connection between concentration and competition. As a matter of fact, all independent variables lose their explanatory power for this sample period (see Table 7 ).
Is there a connection between competition and profitability?(H3)
The final building block of the SCP paradigm is the relationship between market conduct and profitability. Table 8 presents the results if we regress profitability (return on equity or return on assets) on the H statistic and the control variables. We have used three different samples. In the first Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, */**/*** significant at 10/5/1% level.
we use all available estimates for the H-statistic (column a). As these estimates are from two different studies, we have also used the H estimates from our two sources separately. In column (b) we employ the data of Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) , while in column (c) the estimates of Bikker and Haaf (2002) are used. Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, */**/*** significant at 10/5/1% level Table 8 shows that there is no connection between competition and profits. In none of the six regressions do we find a relationship between competition and profits. The coefficients do have the right sign, but are never significantly different from zero. We do find, once again, a negative connection between interest rates and profits. In addition, there is also evidence that inflation and bank profitability are positively related. Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, */**/*** significant at 10/5/1% level
Is it efficiency that improves profits? (H4)
The efficiency hypothesis assumes a positive connection between efficiency and profits. Since Wagenvoort and Schure (1999) and Altunbas et al. (2001) both calculate the degree of inefficiency, we expect, on the basis of the hypotheses, negative coefficients in the regression. The estimated equations have profitability as dependent variable (ROE in column 1 and ROA in column 2 of Table   9 ) and the (in)efficiency measures and control variables as independent variables. In column ( Notes: t-statistics in parentheses, */**/*** significant at 10/5/1% level One of the consequences was a higher degree of concentration in the banking markets of most EU countries. Earlier research pointed to the existence of monopolistic competition in the European banking markets (De Bandt and Davis, 2000) and the possibility of a negative relation between the degree of concentration and profitability (Bikker and Groeneveld, 2000) . However, our results suggest that caution is in order.
For the largest possible sample, we find some evidence for a positive relationship between concentration and profitability (cf. Huizinga and Demirgüç-Kunt, 1998). However, this finding is not robust as it is not confirmed if data for a more recent sample are used. Our results suggest, furthermore, that there is no connection between concentration on the one hand and market competition on the other, nor did we find evidence that competitive conditions are related to profitability. We only find mixed evidence for the hypothesis that efficiency improves profits. Our data does not show a connection between efficiency and concentration, while the relationship between efficiency and profits strongly depends on the chosen efficiency indicator.
Finally, some caveats are in order as to the nature of the analysis. An initial problem is the limited availability of data for the EU countries. Data on profitability are relatively easy to obtain, but there is a lack of good data on concentration, H values and efficiency indicators. This restricts the number of years that can be examined and makes it difficult to determine the extent to which the results are generally applicable. The choice of a certain indicator can strongly determine the outcome, partly explaining the difference between our conclusions and those of Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) .
Another problem lies in the question of what exactly is meant by the European banking market. The above analysis assumes that, in the period under review, the banking markets in the fifteen EU countries were homogenous and distinctly separate from each other (see Neuberger (1997) for a discussion). The first simplification is that, say, the difference between the corporate market and consumer market is not taken into account. Such an assumption is defensible, but it should be remembered that certain information will be lost in this way. The second simplification is that crossborder activities between banking sectors are left out of consideration. Since earlier studies concluded that there was no European market in place for most banking services, this assumption can also be defended.
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